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 Industry, State, and Electrical
 Technology in the Ruhr circa 1900
 By Edmund N. Todd*
 CONSTRUCTING ELECTRIC POWER and light systems early in the twen-
 tieth century challenged existing institutional boundaries. Large-scale tech-
 nological systems had a wide variety of internal components, the development of
 which provided new opportunities to serve more customers and wider areas. If
 controlled by one institution, the growth of a technological system might benefit
 that institution and not others. Such was the case with electricity. Deployment of
 electric power systems required renegotiation of institutional boundaries, as
 leaders of various organized bodies used new technology to promote their own
 interests.
 The problem of analyzing the development of early power systems is not sim-
 ply one of establishing whether public or private individuals should build public
 utilities. That is an old and sterile debate. To understand the process of change, it
 is more fruitful to investigate how people used technology as a political resource
 in promoting institutional growth and how they resolved their differences.
 Around 1900 there were at least four different kinds of institutions that competed
 to build regional power systems in Germany: electrical manufacturers, municipal
 governments, county administrations, and heavy industrialists. Electrical manu-
 facturers were already involved in building municipal electrical systems, which
 they often owned or leased. Electricity was also among the many services al-
 ready supplied by municipal administrations. As alternating-current technology
 improved, municipal systems expanded and often came into conflict with power-
 ful state officials at the county (Landkreis) level of administration, who oversaw
 the supply of services to their rural constituents. Finally, industrialists were
 building power systems to generate electricity for their firms' consumption and
 sometimes for sale.
 The Ruhr provides a useful focus for investigating institutional and technologi-
 cal change. It is a fairly small region, some forty miles long and perhaps twenty
 miles wide. In the later part of the nineteenth century, the development of heavy
 industry led it to become one of the most densely populated regions in Germany.
 The rapid growth of population required new public service systems. During the
 late 1880s electric manufacturers approached municipal governments about
 building electric central stations, but met little success in the Ruhr. The largest
 cities developed their own public service systems, and several of them expanded
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 their electric power and light systems to serve surrounding county areas. Thus in
 the Ruhr some of Germany's largest cities and most-powerful municipal adminis-
 trations came into confrontation with powerful local state officials. County com-
 missioners (Landrdte), the linchpins of the Prussian bureaucracy, were instru-
 mental in building regional public service systems and hoped also to control new
 electric power systems. By the 1890s heavy industrial leaders had organized a
 regional syndicate, the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, to set production
 quotas and market coal, and they were seeking ways to rationalize production to
 reduce costs. Electricity provided an opportunity to integrate productive facili-
 ties and to sell a new by-product. New large-scale organizations that were na-
 tional or even international in orientation dominated heavy industry and electri-
 cal manufacturing. In the Ruhr they confronted both the old state apparatus
 designed for an agricultural state and newer municipal administrative organiza-
 tions that threatened the power of the state at the local level.1
 Divergent social, political, and economic goals brought the leaders of the dif-
 ferent institutions into conflict, and electrical technology became a powerful in-
 strument in negotiating relations among cities, counties, heavy industrial firms,
 and to a lesser extent electrical manufacturers. While municipal governments
 could tie surrounding county areas to themselves through new public service
 technologies, county governments often fought to maintain their independence
 from municipal control. Conflict between city and county had an important im-
 pact on electrification. County officials hoped to ward off municipal control by
 creating regional systems, and they had some success, particularly in building
 systems for fresh water supply and waste water disposal. County governments
 controlled the use of streets and were crucial in deploying new electric technol-
 ogy. Landrate hoped electricity would promote rural economic development.
 After 1900 several heavy industrialists added to the confusion by promoting eco-
 nomic concentration in the form of vertically integrated coal, iron, and steel
 companies. They also threatened to take over several public service technologies
 and hence to dominate economic and technology policy in the Ruhr. The state
 opposed them. Conflict was rife. As a result, those who built technological sys-
 tems also constructed new institutions designed to resolve conflict over the con-
 trol of electrical technology in the years 1904 to 1909.
 I. ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURERS
 Electrical manufacturers built the first electric central stations in Germany. Emil
 Rathenau became a patent licensee for the Edison system after visiting the Paris
 International Electrical Exhibition in 1881. Three years later he built a power
 station in Berlin. To develop the electric lighting business in Germany, Rathenau
 organized the Allgemeine Elektrizitdts-Gesellschaft (AEG) in 1887, and the Ber-
 lin electric lighting company became an AEG subsidiary.2 During the 1880s the
 I For the development of municipal systems in the Ruhr see Edmund N. Todd, "Technology and
 Interest Group Politics: Electrification of the Ruhr, 1886-1930" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. Pennsylvania,
 1984), pp. 18-72.
 2 For the transfer of Edison's system to Germany and the development of the Berlin power system
 see Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Balti-
 more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 66-75, 175-200. My intellectual debt to Professor
 Hughes is extensive.
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 AEG became an important competitor of Siemens and Halske, which had grown
 large on telegraphy business. The AEG had close ties to banks from its inception
 and was quick to develop the kind of managerial hierarchy and multidivisional
 structure necessary to expand into a new area of business with rapid technologi-
 cal change. Siemens retained its older style of personal management until 1890,
 when its founder retired and the company became a leader in developing new
 managerial structures. Siemens was then able to regain its position, although
 AEG continued to be its chief rival. After 1900 the two giants of German electri-
 cal manufacturing absorbed most of their smaller competitors.3
 Electrical manufacturers actively sought to sell electric lighting systems to mu-
 nicipal governments in the 1880s and 1890s. They sometimes established subsidi-
 aries to operate the stations, as the AEG did in Berlin. In the Ruhr, the electrical
 manufacturer Lahmeyer founded the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk
 (RWE) in 1898 to operate the central station for the city of Essen. The creation of
 subsidiaries allowed the inclusion of local interests and local capital, while hold-
 ing companies financed and organized central station subsidiaries. Electrical
 manufacturers also provided advice and information on building power systems,
 in order to promote the sale of equipment by helping cities to establish central
 stations. Municipal governments needed advice to make sense out of the vast
 variety of plans resulting from the inchoate nature of the technology. Choosing
 one electrical manufacturer solved the problem of selecting a system, particularly
 if the manufacturer promised a good return for its monopoly of city streets.
 However, city governments had developed a distrust of private capitalists oper-
 ating public service technologies, particularly in the case of gas lighting. Hence
 some city governments preferred to hire engineers to build a municipal power
 system composed of components from several different manufacturers. Dort-
 mund followed this path.4
 After 1900 electrical manufacturers continued to be important sources of infor-
 mation for municipal and state governments interested in building regional sys-
 tems. Electrical manufacturers also became important proponents of regional and
 even national systems. As early as 1912, Georg Klingenberg of the AEG began
 suggesting that a national system was possible and desirable. He promoted his
 vision in a series of essays in the German electrical journal Elektrotechnische
 Zeitschrift before and during the war. Walther Rathenau, son of the founder of
 the AEG, also promoted a national system through a financial union that, he
 hoped, would facilitate technological development. Both thought that the state
 would have to play a key role in building such a system as a means of overcom-
 ing local control of the technology. Klingenberg noted in 1913 that Landrate, not
 mayors, had built regional systems, and as a result the state had to step in to
 ensure that the organization of the technology could move ahead to the next
 3 For these developments in electrical manufacturing see Jurgen Kocka, "Siemens und der Auf-
 haltsame Aufstieg der AEG," Tradition, 1972, 17:125-142; and Kocka, "Entrepreneurs and Managers
 in German Industrialization," in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 7 vols. (Cambridge:
 Cambridge Univ. Press, 1978), Vol. VII, pp. 492-589, 709-727, esp. pp. 558-562, 569.
 4 Erich Zweigert, Die Verwaltung der Stadt Essen im XIX. Jahrhundert mit besonderer Beruck-
 sichtigung der letzten funfzehn Jahre (Essen: G. D. Baedeker, 1902), pp. 567-599; "Zusammenstel-
 lung der Submissionresultate," 14 Aug. 1895, B 3-1304, pp. 84-85, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; Hans-
 Dieter Brunkhorst, Kommunalisierung in 19. Jahrhundert dargestellt am Beispiel der Gaswirtschaft
 in Deutschland (Munich: Tuduv, 1978); and C. Dopke, Das stadtische Elektrizitatswerk in Dortmund
 (Dortmund: F. W. Ruhfus, 1900).
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 stage of development in a national system. Both Klingenberg and Rathenau
 wanted industry-that is, electrical manufacturers-to run the system created by
 state intervention. They sought institutional allies to gain control of a nation-
 al grid.5
 II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS
 Industrial development in the western provinces after the 1870s brought signifi-
 cant changes in the distribution of population in Germany from the east to the
 west and from rural to urban areas. Growing cities developed housing, transpor-
 tation, water, sewage, health, and lighting problems. Throughout Germany, mu-
 nicipal governments became much more active in dealing with urban problems
 and became noted for their "municipal socialism." Municipal governments began
 providing services and even began operating businesses such as slaughterhouses
 to generate income so that cities could provide other services without raising
 taxes. Supplying gas and water to city populations was among the earliest tasks
 taken up by municipal governments. During the 1850s Bochum and Duisburg
 established the first gas facilities in the Ruhr. In 1864 Essen opened the first
 waterworks, and in the 1870s other cities followed its lead. Municipal adminis-
 trations became more professional and expanded in size as they increased ser-
 vices. After unification of Germany in 1871, several cities gained independence
 from county control: Essen in 1873, Duisburg in 1874, Dortmund in 1875, and
 Bochum in 1876. These cities no longer reported to Landrate and thus had more
 freedom from direct state control.6
 Essen and Dortmund provide good examples of how municipal administrations
 and mayors became involved in solving municipal problems. In Essen heavy
 industrial development brought a large number of health, housing, and welfare
 problems. Attempts on the part of private citizens to deal with those problems
 proved unsuccessful in the 1860s and 1870s, and as a result the city administra-
 tion became increasingly active. Erich Zweigert, mayor from 1886 to 1906, accel-
 erated this development, so that by 1914 the municipal government touched al-
 most all aspects of city life. He took decisive steps to solve the housing problem
 by outmaneuvering the Landrat of the county of Essen to double the area of the
 city in 1901. The increase in territory allowed the city to plan housing necessary
 for its rapidly growing population. Mayor Wilhelm Schmieding of Dortmund also
 exemplified the qualities of the new, active mayors throughout Germany. He
 believed that city governments should provide water, gas, electricity, transporta-
 5 Helga Nussbaum, "Versuche zur reichsgesetzlichen Regelung der deutschen Elektrizitatswirt-
 schaft und zu ihrer Uberfuhrung in Reichseigentum 1909 bis 1914," Jahrbuch fur Wirtschaftsge-
 schichte, 1969, Pt. 2, pp. 117-203; Georg Klingenberg, "Richtlinien fur den Bau groler Elektrizitats-
 werke mit Dampfbetrieb," Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift, 1912, 33:731-735, 766-769, 796-800,
 814-818, 880-882; Klingenberg, "Elektrische GroBwirtschaft unter staatlicher Mitwirkung," ibid.,
 1916, 37:297-298, 314-317, 328-333, 343-348; Walther Rathenau, "Denkschrift, betreffend ein
 Reichs-Elektrizitatsmonopol," 13 Nov. 1913, Deutsches Zentralarchiv Potsdam, Reichskanzlei, Vol.
 598a, pp. 372-379v, rpt. in Nussbaum, "Versuche," pp. 192-203; and Georg Klingenberg, "Elektri-
 zitatswerke und Uberlandzentralen," Elektrotech. Z., 1913, 34:315-317.
 6 Wolfgang R. Krabbe, "Munizipalsozialismus und Interventionsstaat: Die Ausbreitung der stadtis-
 chen Leistungsverwaltung im Kaiserreich," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, 1979,
 30:265-283; and Helmuth Croon, "Stadtewandlung und Stadtebildung im Ruhrgebiet im 19. Jahrhun-
 dert," in Aus Geschichte und Landeskunde: Forschungen und Darstellungen (Bonn: Rohrscheid,
 1960), pp. 484-501.
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 tion, parks, and public welfare institutions. The administrations in Essen and
 Dortmund, like other municipal administrations, had become quite intervention-
 ary in their relationships to economic and social development by 1900.7
 To solve local problems, municipal governments often sought to work through
 private companies. Before the 1850s municipal governments avoided risks on
 new gas technology by having private companies introduce gas lighting systems.
 Municipal governments began considering municipal ownership as a means of
 increasing their incomes from gas, but during the 1860s most cities continued to
 allow private ownership of gas lighting systems and signed new long-term con-
 tracts to gain expanded and improved service. As they increased their economic
 activities, municipal administrations began promoting technological change in the
 gas lighting industry to improve services further. Private owners were less inter-
 ested in upgrading their systems, however, since they were receiving steady in-
 comes and wished to amortize investment in existing facilities. Thus during the
 1880s and 1890s many cities purchased gas companies in order to improve light-
 ing service. Previously, civil servants had not thought it appropriate to spend tax
 money on risky ventures, and they were wary of attempting to manage produc-
 tive facilities. By the 1880s and 1890s, however, gas technology had largely
 proved itself, and municipal administrations needed new sources of income to
 help finance other services. Municipal administrations solved the management
 problem by creating a separate administrative structure for the gasworks. There
 were also a number of legal forms available, such as partnerships, companies
 with limited liability (Gesellschaften mit beschrdnkter Haftung), and joint stock
 companies (Aktien-Gesellschaften), that provided other institutional forms for
 managing a productive facility. These forms were more important for electri-
 fication.8
 Private capitalist control of the technological system could prevent technologi-
 cal change. In Dortmund, for instance, the municipal government could not per-
 suade the privately owned gas company to introduce electric lighting in the early
 1890s. The gas company received judicial support for its assertion that its con-
 tract with the city gave it exclusive control of municipal streets for lighting sys-
 tems, forcing the city to renegotiate its contract with the company. In exchange
 for a longer contract and the right to deliver gas for heating and cooking pur-
 poses, the gas company agreed to give up its exclusive use of city streets for
 lighting and to allow the city to begin operating its own electric lighting system.9
 Essen's experience with electric traction illustrates the same problem: private
 companies often refused to improve their technological systems and sometimes
 prevented technological change. Because no one in Essen's municipal adminis-
 tration thought that a traction system could pay for itself, the city had developed
 a contract to induce private parties to build a system for the city. In the early
 1890s the city renegotiated the contract to persuade the private company to build
 an electric rather than a steam traction system, but since the contract did not
 7Eugene Charles McCreary, "Essen 1860-1914: A Case Study of the Impact of Industrialization on
 German Community Life" (Ph.D. diss., Yale Univ., 1964); and Friedrich Horstmann, "Dr. phil. h.c.
 Wilhelm Schmieding, Oberburgermeister der Stadt Dortmund 1886-1910," Beitrage zur Geschichte
 Dortmunds und der Grafschaft Mark, 1962, 58:304-324.
 8 Brunkhorst, Kommunalisierung (cit. n. 4).
 9 For a general discussion of private gas company reactions to electricity see ibid., pp. 142-147.
 For Dortmund see Todd, "Technology and Politics" (cit. n. 1), pp. 27-30, 38-39.
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 preserve any direct role for the municipal administration in the company, the city
 had no leverage in dealing with the company. Soon after its completion the trac-
 tion system proved inadequate. The city administration spent the later half of the
 1890s trying to find a way to force the private company to improve and expand
 the system to serve areas of the city that might not provide as high a rate of
 return on capital investment as other, more densely populated areas.10 Municipal
 governments learned that private companies might take the initial risk of intro-
 ducing new technology but might not continue to do so if they were making
 profits on their initial investment. Experience during the 1890s with private com-
 panies proved important after 1900, when heavy industrialists began taking over
 public utilities.
 There was another aspect of municipal development that proved important in
 electrification. Essen and Dortmund had evolved as administrative, economic,
 and transportation centers. Dortmund was the seat of two state organizations-
 the Superior Mining Office (Oberbergamt) and the Superior Post Office (Ober-
 postdirektion)-and its Guild Chamber (Handwerkskammer) provided further re-
 gional significance. Essen was the seat of various mining associations, the Ruhr's
 railroad administration, and regional organizations for water and sewage. Its
 banks made Essen a financial center for the Ruhr. Essen and Dortmund also had
 chambers of commerce, whose importance reached beyond municipal bound-
 aries. Because they played such key roles in their areas, Essen and Dortmund
 eventually incorporated almost their entire county areas, organized in the early
 nineteenth century. Both cities also had integrated elites who supported munici-
 pal administrations that looked beyond city boundaries to solve regional prob-
 lems. Mayors Zweigert and Schmieding were therefore both instrumental in in-
 troducing electrical technology in the form of alternating-current systems that
 would enable their cities to serve customers beyond municipal boundaries. How-
 ever, municipal control of regional technological systems threatened the indepen-
 dence of surrounding communities and counties, and thus it might prevent the
 development of regional technological systems. Aware of this problem, Mayor
 Zweigert had the Landrat of the county of Essen lead negotiations for the street-
 car system that would serve county and city. He also recognized that private
 control of the streetcar system would overcome the fears of Essen's neighbors."
 III. LANDRATE AND THE STATE
 In the late 1870s the state in Germany turned away from its earlier laissez-faire
 orientation and became more active in the economy. One outcome of this change
 was a new tariff policy in 1879 to protect certain industries and east Elbian agri-
 culture. In the early 1890s the new Reich chancellor, Leo von Caprivi, lowered
 agricultural tariffs as part of a government economic policy to expand opportuni-
 ties for German industry in foreign markets and increase employment. His new
 10 Erich Zweigert to town council (Stadtverordnete-Versammlung), 28 Dec. 1902, Rep. 102, I,
 1274, pp. 38-83, Stadtarchiv Essen.
 11 Croon, "Stidtewandlung" (cit. n. 6); Helmuth Croon, "Zur Entwicklung der Stadte im 19. und
 20. Jahrhundert," Studium Generale, 1963, 16:565-575; Croon, "Burgertum und Verwaltung in den
 Stadten des Ruhrgebiets im 19. Jahrhundert," Tradition, 1964, 9:23-41; Edmund N. Todd, "A Tale of
 Three Cities: Electrification and the Structure of Choice in the Ruhr, 1886-1900," Social Studies of
 Science, 1987, 17:387-412; and Zweigert to town council, 28 Dec. 1902 (cit. n. 10).
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 policies did help produce rapid industrial development, which led to an important
 debate concerning Germany's shift from an agricultural to an industrial state. In
 part, the government became increasingly involved in response to real problems
 faced by the elites holding power as the population was moving into industry and
 electoral politics was producing an increasingly large faction of Social Democrats
 in the Reichstag. Some groups opposed the development of an industrial and
 urban society as an unhealthy threat to the Prussian state and German culture.
 Conservatives took up these ideas in the 1890s to buttress the position of the
 aristocracy and agricultural interests. A rural-romantic orientation became popu-
 lar among some groups in German society, including Prussian bureaucrats, who
 to a large extent represented the interests of the aristocracy.12
 The antiurban and anti-industrial orientation of Prussian state officials affected
 the development of local state institutions, particularly in the industrializing and
 urbanizing areas. Prussian state institutions reached down to the local village;
 thus Prussian ministers in Berlin could, in theory, use the bureaucracy to exert a
 substantial degree of local control. The most important positions in the exercise
 of local control were the district president (Regierungsprdsident) and the Land-
 rat (county commissioner). The district president reported directly to Berlin and
 directed the administrative activities of the Landrate in his government district
 (Regierungsbezirk). The district president did not have a legislative body through
 which he could create new local legislation but instead had to work through
 Landrate to create local responses to local problems. Counties had a level of
 self-government (Selbstverwaltung) over which Landrate presided; Landrdte
 thus had a dual function. They were administrators who reported to a district
 president and ultimately to the minister of the interior in Berlin, but they
 also had a certain amount of local autonomy owing to their ability to direct legisla-
 tion in their counties. Landrate could function as entrepreneurs by creating orga-
 nizations to provide services for their counties, and they could join together to
 build regional systems. Landrate also had a degree of autonomy because of their
 local ties. In order to bind local government to the state, the Prussian minister of
 the interior often chose Landrate from the area in which they were going to
 serve, making sure, however, to choose persons loyal to the conservative Prus-
 sian state. Thus Landrdte were tied ideologically to the agrarian-dominated, con-
 servative state bureaucracy, but because of their local connections and local
 power they expressed their administrative and entrepreneurial functions differ-
 ently depending on the region in which they worked and the kind of local clien-
 tele they served.13
 The antiurban orientation of the conservative state preserved the position of
 Landrat and hence state power in industrial regions. Until the 1870s all cities in
 the Ruhr were under the administrative direction of Landrnte. Then in rapid
 succession Essen, Dortmund, Duisburg, and Bochum received full city rights and
 12 For a survey of the literature on the relationship between the aristocracy and the bureaucracy
 see Gary Bonham, "State Autonomy or Class Domination: Approaches to Administrative Politics in
 Wilhelmine Gemany," World Politics, 1983, 35:631-651.
 13 Herbert Jacob, German Administration since Bismarck: Central Authority versus Local Auton-
 omy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 12-62; Heinz Gunther Steinberg, "Zur Ver-
 waltungsgeschichte des Ruhrgebietes," in Politik und Landschaft, ed. Walter Foerst (Cologne/Berlin:
 Grote, 1969), pp. 177-215; and Lysbeth W. Muncy, "The Prussian Landrate in the Last Years of the
 Monarchy: A Case Study of Pomerania and the Rhineland in 1890-1918," Central European History,
 1973, 6:299-338.
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 became independent of Landrate supervision. After the 1870s, however, al-
 though population density increased rapidly in the Ruhr, few cities gained inde-
 pendence. The position of Landrat gave the state more direct control over
 workers and local economic activity than it would have with a mayor in an inde-
 pendent city. Mayors were often too liberal as well. Prussian policies kept large
 numbers of people under the direct control of state officials. In 1911 Hamborn,
 north of Duisburg, held the distinction of being the largest Prussian "rural com-
 munity" (Landgemeinde), with 100,000 inhabitants. At that time there were
 ninety-nine "rural communities" in Prussia with more than 10,000 inhabitants, all
 in industrial areas. The Rhineland and Westphalia together had fifty-one, while
 other areas of Prussia contained three hundred "cities" with fewer than 2,500
 inhabitants. 14
 Landrate in the Ruhr opposed the change from an agrarian to an industrial and
 urban nation and hoped to use modern technology to direct change along other
 paths. Karl Gerstein, Landrat in the county of Bochum from 1900 to 1919, be-
 lieved that farmers were crucial for a healthy state but were losing ground. His
 position as Landrat gave him the means to shape industrial and urban develop-
 ment so as to preserve the independence of rural communities. He opposed the
 growth of large cities through incorporation of neighboring communities because
 the process destroyed local self-government and the communal, economic, and
 cultural life necessary for a healthy society. To oppose the expansion of large
 cities and preserve the autonomy of rural communities and small towns, Gerstein
 worked to establish regional rather than municipal public utility systems. This
 was a sound policy that helped overcome the parochial orientation of cities. The
 influx of laborers into the Ruhr's growing industrial productive sites placed sig-
 nificant demands on local budgets to provide necessary services. Through public
 service systems for gas, water, transportation, and electricity, towns and cities
 tried to increase their own incomes and at the same time prevent a distribution of
 income to surrounding communities faced with the same kinds of financial prob-
 lems. Landrate could work against such parochial policies because they served a
 larger area, the county, than did municipal governments.'5
 Landrat Gerstein was a key figure in organizing a number of regional systems
 to deal with the problems of urbanization and industrialization. In 1902 he orga-
 nized a public water supply system, the Verbandswasserwerk GmbH, to enable
 financially weak communities in the counties of Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, and
 Hattingen to gain their independence from the city of Bochum by securing a
 common supply of water. The business form chosen enabled each community to
 hold a block of shares and to include new communal groups through the sale of
 stock.'6 Gerstein also took decisive steps to solve regional sewage and waste
 water problems. The population along the Emscher River had increased from
 14 Helmuth Croon, "Die VerwaltungsmaJige Gliederung des mittleren Ruhrgebietes im 19. und 20.
 Jahrhundert," in Bochum und das mittlere Ruhrgebiet, ed. Gesellschaft fur Geographie und Geologie
 Bochum (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1965), pp. 59-64, on p. 61.
 15 Alfred zur Nieden, "Karl Gerstein," Rheinisch-Westfdlische Wirtschaftsbiographie, 13 vols.
 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1932-), Vol. 1, pp. 487-518; Franz-Josef Bruggemeier, Leben vor Ort: Ruhr-
 bergleute und Ruhrbergbau, 1889-1919 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1983), pp. 32-41.
 16 Nieden, "Gerstein," pp. 502-504; and Ludwig Aschoff, "Die Gruppenwasserversorgung in
 rheinisch-westfalischen Industriebezirke durch das Verbandswasserwerk," Technisches Gemeinde-
 blatt: Zeitschriftfiur die Technischen und Hygienischen Aufgaben der Verwaltung, 1905, 7:337-341.
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 35,000 in 1870 to 1,340,000 in 1900 as mining activities moved northward in the
 Ruhr. Mining caused the ground to settle, thus increasing the swampy conditions
 along the slow-moving Emscher. As Regierungsassessor (government assessor)
 in charge of water management in the government district of Arnsberg before
 becoming Landrat, Gerstein had recognized the need for a regional solution to
 deal with problems in a zone divided among 2 provinces, 3 government districts,
 6 cities, 8 counties, 43 Amter (offices), and 137 local communities. In 1904 the
 Emschergenossenschaft was established to regulate the Emscher so as to solve
 pressing problems resulting from urbanization and industrialization while pre-
 serving the autonomy of the communities between the Emscher and the Ruhr
 rivers. Public and private organizations producing the sewage and waste water
 contributed funds, but control was in the hands of the participating cities and
 Landkreise. Gerstein became the chairman of the Genossenschaft in 1906.17
 Landrate like Gerstein worked against the narrower perspectives of municipal
 governments in developing organizations that could deal with regional problems.
 These organizations provided potential models for regional electric light and
 power systems. They also reflected the opposition of Landrate and other state
 officials to urbanization and industrial concentration. Landrate had already
 found the means for building Ruhr-wide technological systems to maintain local
 control and promote local development when heavy industrialists began chal-
 lenging state power in the Ruhr. These industrialists were to present a fourth
 institutional niche for the building of a regional electric power and light system.
 IV. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ELECTRICITY
 One of the key issues in German history concerns the development of large-scale
 industries with complex managerial hierarchies. One current line of thought is
 that modern multiunit enterprises developed as a means of overcoming the ad-
 vantages that England had on the world market. Banks helped surmount capital
 shortages by concentrating capital from a large number of people, while joint
 stock companies enabled a firm to draw on savings of small shareholders to
 invest in new forms of production technology that would allow the Germans to
 compete with the English. Increasing the scale of production required new means
 of managing large numbers of people involved in diverse stages of production,
 sometimes in different locations. These changes were perhaps most evident in
 German steel, iron, and coal production, particularly in the Ruhr. There, coal
 mining required concentration of capital, and as a result, banks were involved
 early in financing the introduction of deep shaft mining. Iron and steel companies
 developed a diverse line of goods to attract customers and sought to integrate
 production from raw materials to finished product. Some iron and steel manufac-
 turers purchased coal mines to build vertically integrated companies. A further
 incentive to technological integration of the firm came with attempts to cut down
 on fuel costs from heating iron ore, pig iron, and then steel in several different
 stages of production from blast furnace to finished product. Production in "one
 17 Heinrich Helbing, "Die Emschergenossenschaft, Essen," in 25 Jahre Emschergenossenschaft,
 1900-1925, ed. Helbing (Essen: Emschergenossenschaft, 1925), pp. 1-17; Hans Luther, "Vorwort:
 Die Emschergenossenschaft als besondere Verwaltungsform des Ruhrgebietes," ibid., pp. v-xii; and
 Alexander Ramshorn, "Die Emschergenossenschaft," in Fiunfzig Jahre Emschergenossenschaft,
 1906-1956, ed. Ramshorn (Essen: Emschergenossenschaft, 1957), pp. 33-82.
 252 EDMUND N. TODD
 heat" required extensive financial resources and managerial control to ensure a
 smooth flow of material through the company.18
 During the 1890s heavy industrial companies searched for ways of reducing
 costs. Gas engines provided one means of turning a waste product into a usable
 commodity. They could burn either blast-furnace gas or coking gas, although
 they usually used blast-furnace gas, since coking gas could be sold more profit-
 ably for lighting. In the late 1890s the Horder Verein introduced the first blast-
 furnace gas engine. Within ten years engines producing up to 4,000 horsepower
 allowed companies to utilize blast-furnace gas to power blast equipment or elec-
 tric dynamos. This development in the iron and steel industry meant that large
 companies were not readily available as consumers of publicly generated elec-
 tricity. But they could sell electricity. Coal mines also developed an electric-
 generating capacity in order to utilize waste coal that could not be sold or other-
 wise used. They introduced turbines and exhaust turbines, using steam from
 other turbines, to generate electricity. Both gas engines and waste coal-fired
 turbines improved the energy efficiency of the Ruhr's heavy industry.19
 After 1900 heavy industrial companies began building electric transmission and
 distribution systems in the Ruhr. A large company often had productive facilities
 in several different areas, and electric transmission systems allowed a company
 to tie facilities together to improve overall efficiency in a technologically inte-
 grated system. A company could also improve its use of its installed equipment
 by providing electricity to neighboring communities, since industry and local
 communities had different load patterns. Industry showed peak periods of con-
 sumption in the early morning and early afternoon, whereas towns had a lighting
 load in the early evening. Industrial systems supplying towns could therefore
 utilize equipment more fully, thus increasing the income from fixed capital in-
 vestments. Towns could gain a cheap source of electricity without having to
 build or expand municipal power stations.20
 Several companies promoted this model of electrification, but the most impor-
 tant example was the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektrizitatswerk (RWE). The
 electrical manufacturing firm Lahmeyer had established the RWE in 1898 to
 operate the electric power and light system in the city of Essen. In 1902, to
 overcome financial difficulties, Lahmeyer sold its shares in the RWE to two
 leading heavy industrialists, Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen. The RWE built
 its first power station on a Stinnes mine, from which it drew steam to circumvent
 the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate's coal quotas and prices. After 1902 the
 RWE also began transmitting electricity to another Stinnes mine, which be-
 came the first mine in the Ruhr to depend wholly on an outside source of elec-
 tricity. The RWE supplemented its own generation of electricity by arranging
 18 Jurgen Kocka, "The Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise in Germany," in Managerial
 Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, ed. Alfred
 D. Chandler, Jr., and Herman Daems (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 77-116;
 and Kocka, "Entrepreneurs and Managers" (cit. n. 3), pp. 555-589.
 19 For the development of gas engines and heavy industrial power systems see H. Bonte, "EinfluB
 der Grol3gasmachine auf die Entwicklung der HIittenwerke." Zeitschrift des Vereines Deutscher In-
 genieure, 1908. 52:1912-1916; and Die Entwiickelung des Niederrheinische-Westfilischen Steinkoh-
 len-Bergbaues in der zwieiten Hlafte des 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. Verein fMr die Bergbaulichen Interes-
 sen, 12 vols. (Berlin: Springer, 1902-1905). Vol. VIII, pp. 417-719.
 20 Professor Baum, "Beitrage zur Frage der Krafterzeugung und Kraftverwertung auf Berg-
 werken," Gluckauf, 1906,42:1001-1015. 1033-1047, 1083-1088, 1137-1155.,on pp. 1144-1155.
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 energy exchange contracts with several heavy industrial firms (Deutsch-
 Luxemburgische Bergwerks- und Hutten-AG, Gewerkschaft Deutscher Kaiser,
 and the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG). Stinnes sought to build the RWE into a
 company serving the area from the Lippe River to Aachen. It looked to some like
 the ideal combination of heavy industrial generation of electricity and industrial
 and communal consumption. Stinnes thus promoted a fourth model: regional
 electrification in private hands and closely tied to heavy industrial interests.21
 V. BUILDING A REGIONAL SYSTEM
 By 1902 there were four institutional structures that might have provided a basis
 for a new regional technological system in the Ruhr. At this time alternating-
 current transmission systems combined with the increasing size of steam turbines
 permitted and perhaps even required regional systems, which could supply a
 variety of customers with varied demand schedules and hence allow a more bal-
 anced load on equipment. Municipal systems could expand outward and serve
 surrounding areas, but state officials wanted to avoid economic and demographic
 concentration in cities. In the Ruhr, Landrate had helped organize new institu-
 tions to deal with regional problems by maintaining local control and opposing
 urban concentration, and they hoped to do the same for electricity. Electrical
 manufacturers offered a third institutional structure, one that would place control
 in their hands and might avoid urban or state control. Heavy industrialists pro-
 moted development of a regional system, but one narrowly tied to heavy indus-
 trial goals. From 1904 to 1909 in the Ruhr, members of these four types of organi-
 zations struggled to build and control an electric power and light system for the
 Ruhr. The confrontation over the new technology involved important institu-
 tional and political stakes and could not be resolved within the existing institu-
 tional framework, or within one technological system.
 The immediate impetus for conflict came from Stinnes and Thyssen. They
 began to expand the RWE to serve an area that encompassed the Ruhr at the
 very time that they were trying to reorganize heavy industry there. The RWE
 provided a technological means for the reorganization. In 1905 the company
 began building its second power station on a mine controlled by Stinnes near
 Dortmund. It sought to supply several of Stinnes's holdings around Bochum and
 gained customers near its new Westphalian power station. The power company
 also tried to build lines to connect its new power station and its old one in
 Essen.2 Concurrently, to implement their organizational goals the two heavy
 industrialists tried to take over one of the largest coal mining companies in the
 Ruhr, Emil Kirdorf's Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG. When this attempt failed,
 they helped Kirdorf convert his company into a vertically integrated mining and
 foundry company. Kirdorf also signed an energy exchange contract with the
 21 For the early development of the RWE see Zweigert, Verwaltung (cit. n. 4), pp. 567-599; Ca-
 millo J. Asriel, Das R.W.E., Rheinisch-Westfalisches Elektriziatswerk A.G., Essen a. d. Ruhr: Ein
 Beitrag zur Erforschung der modernen Elektrizitatswirtschaft (Zurich: Girsberger, 1930), pp. 1-24;
 and Ernst Henke, Das RWE nach seinen Geschdftsberichten, 1898-1948 (Essen: RWE, 1948), pp.
 5-27. For a report of Stinnes's goals see Arthur Schreiber (district president of Dusseldorf), "Bespre-
 chung uber die Versorgung des rheinisch-westfalischen Industriegebietes mit Elektrizitat durch das
 Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerk," 8 Dec. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 294-298,
 Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf (hereafter HStA Dui); and Baum, "Beitrage," pp. 1007, 1153.
 22 Asriel, R.W.E., pp. 7-8; Henke, RWE, pp. 15-19.
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 RWE and joined its board of directors. Because of Stinnes's maneuvers in heavy
 industry and electric power, state officials became concerned about the state's
 relationship to the economy and to economic leaders in the Ruhr. To protect
 their power, Prussian officials sought to purchase a controlling interest in a large
 coal mine (Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia) but met stiff opposition from many
 heavy industrialists in a confrontation that became known as the "Hibernia Af-
 fair."23 State officials also became anxious about the effect Stinnes might have on
 electrification, which they saw as related to his maneuvers in heavy industry.24
 The Ruhr fell mostly within the government districts of Dusseldorf in the Rhine
 province and Arnsberg in Westphalia, and their presidents organized the initial
 state reaction to the RWE. They opposed the private monopoly of a public ser-
 vice. The district president in Arnsberg thought such a monopoly would become
 a "pressing burden" on the public, and he observed that the section of heavy
 industry connected to the RWE exerted "great influence" on many communities
 in the Ruhr. That section would support the RWE's expressed concern for the
 common good and "cultural progress" only so long as it did not conflict with
 heavy industry's "financial interests." The district president in Dusseldorf be-
 lieved that a private monopoly would make the Ruhr's economic development
 depend on the RWE. To protect local communities from "adroit business repre-
 sentatives," the district presidents sought to ensure adequate technical advice by
 coordinating responses to the RWE.25 They also gained the right to review the
 RWE's petitions to lay transmission and distribution lines on railroad property.
 This important concession prevented the RWE from circumventing a commu-
 nity's main bargaining chip, control of streets for supply systems. If the RWE
 could use railroad rights of way, it could build up a set of powerful local cus-
 tomers who might insist that a community sign a supply contract favorable to the
 RWE and not to the community.26
 Despite similarities in views and tactics, negotiations in the two areas followed
 different paths. The district president of Dusseldorf called several meetings in fall
 1905 with leading electrical manufacturers to discuss an electric supply system
 that would be independent of Stinnes and the RWE. Topics included a loose
 alliance of systems rather than one big system controlled by the RWE, and a
 system based on a coal mine on the left bank. Georg Klingenberg, who later
 promoted a national grid, argued that there were limits in size above which it was
 not economical to build a power system. Hence he discounted the alliance of
 systems and supported a system serving the left bank. The district president
 identified a key characteristic of any such system: it would have to match RWE
 23 For the changing relationship between state and industry and the "Hibernia Affair" see Charles
 Medalen, "State Monopoly Capitalism in Germany: The Hibernia Affair," Past and Present, 1978,
 78:82-112.
 24 See the draft report, Privy Councillor Putch (Government District of Dusseldorf) to Minister of
 Public Works, 16 Jan. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf Prasidialburo 1068, pp. 5-12, HStA Da.
 25 Franz von Coels (district president of Arnsberg) to Hugo Stinnes, 8 Dec. 1905, Regierung Dus-
 seldorf 9892, p. 318, HStA Di; Coels to Minister of the Interior, 7 Dec. 1905, Oberprasidium 6238,
 Staatsarchiv Mbnster; Arthur Schreiber to Minister of the Interior, 4 Dec. 1905, Regierung Duissel-
 dorf 9892, pp. 248-253; and Coels to provincial president of Westphalia (Eberhard von der Recke), 31
 May 1904, Oberprasidium 6238. For the district of Dusseldorf see Schreiber to "Landrate, Oberbur-
 germeister, und Btirgermeister,' 27 May 1904, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 11-12.
 26 In August 1905 the minister of public works ordered the railroad administration to consult with
 the district presidents before allowing the RWE to deliver electricity from cables on railroad prop-
 erty; see Minister of Public Works to District President in Dusseldorf, 15 Aug. 1905, Regierung
 Dusseldorf 9892, p. 99.
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 prices in order to persuade communities to sign supply contracts, since he could
 not force them to sign.27 But the RWE already had a number of advantages. By
 1905 it had built an extensive electric power and light system in the Rhine prov-
 ince and in Westphalia and could offer low prices to potential customers. More-
 over, a communal government did not control it. Hence, the RWE could gain
 counties as customers in a way that a municipal system could not, and municipal
 governments, in turn, could avoid county control by joining the RWE's system.
 For instance, the mayor of the recently established Westphalian city of Gelsen-
 kirchen looked to the RWE for assistance in securing his independence from
 Landrate. In promoting its version of a regional system, the RWE supported the
 mayor of Gelsenkirchen in his bid to open up surrounding county areas for future
 incorporation. The RWE also supported Landrate against mayors where they
 were the more powerful local figures, as it did the Landrat in the Rhenish county
 of Kempen in 1910. For this tactic to succeed, the RWE had to change its busi-
 ness structure to include communal interests. This change did not come, how-
 ever, in time to circumvent opposition in Westphalia, and as a result the RWE
 was unable to include the entire Ruhr in its system.28
 In the district of Arnsberg, the district president, Landrdte, and mayors
 worked together against the Rhenish, heavy industrialist-dominated RWE. The
 district president played a key role in promoting the development of electrifica-
 tion under the control of local state and municipal officials. He hoped to keep
 public service systems in public hands, and he was able to find powerful allies
 among the Landrate of the district. One of the most important Landrdte was Karl
 Gerstein in the county of Bochum. He helped organize a number of meetings to
 coordinate responses to the RWE's expansion. Gerstein wanted a system for the
 entire Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area in order to maintain local autonomy.
 He sought to build a broad consensus for regional electrification among officials
 in Berlin, in regional and local levels of administration, and in local state agencies
 concerned with mining, canals, and railroads. Gerstein also requested support
 from the most important regional coal organization with the argument that a
 unified regional system would benefit the coal industry.29
 A regional solution for the Ruhr in the form of a technological system con-
 trolled by Landrate failed. The communities could not finance the system. Per-
 haps more important, the RWE was already too strong in the Rhenish section of
 the Ruhr, and heavy industrialists opposed state control. Gerstein believed that
 the communal project required the "unlimited cooperation of industry in the en-
 tire region," because each mine shaft would soon be generating electricity. Only
 27 For discussions concerning the left bank see "Besprechung, betr. Lieferung von Elektrizitat fur
 das rheinisch-westfalische Industriegebiet durch das Rheinisch-Westfalische Elektrizitatswerk in
 Essen," 30 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 32044, pp. 73-74, HStA Dui; other reports are contained
 in Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 282-287, 294-298, 313-314, ibid.; and "Besprechung uber die
 Verhandlungen betr. die Versorgung des rheinisch-westfalischen Industriegebietes mit elektrischer
 Kraft," 23 Dec. 1905, Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.
 28 For Gelsenkirchen see Regierung Dusseldorf 32044, pp. 182-184, HStA Du; and Bernard Gold-
 enberg, "Besprechung mit Herrn Oberburgermeister Machens wegen des Demarkation Westfalen," 8
 Jan. 1907, Stinnes Nachlass, 316/1, Archiv fur Christlich Demokratische Politik, Adenauer Stiftung,
 Bonn. For Kempen see W. von Tippelskirch to Landrat Hermann Strahl, 7 May 1910, Stinnes Nach-
 lass, 150/1, ibid. Other mayors were not inclined to follow Gerstein's lead; see District President in
 Arnsberg to Minister of the Interior, 7 Dec. 1907, Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.
 29 Karl Gerstein to District President in Dusseldorf, 10 Aug. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp.
 100-101, 103, 105-106, HStA Di!; Gerstein to Rheinisch-Westfalisches Kohlensyndicat, 12 Aug. 1905,
 Oberprasidium 6238, Staatsarchiv Munster.
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 if the coal mines provided electricity for a communal system to distribute could
 the project supply electricity at the lowest possible rates. But, Gerstein noted,
 the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate rejected collaboration, as did individual
 mines and the industrial corporations controlled by Stinnes, Thyssen, and Kir-
 dorf. Thus collaboration with an influential segment of the Ruhr's heavy industry
 was not possible.30 The institutional context worked against either heavy indus-
 trial or state control of a power system to unify the Ruhr.
 Partial resolution of the conflict came through a blurring of the boundary be-
 tween state and industry in both sections of the Ruhr. Stinnes reorganized the
 RWE to include municipal and county participation. In 1904 and again in 1905 he
 proposed that the Prussian state purchase shares in the RWE and place represen-
 tatives on the company's board of directors. Such a maneuver might have helped
 the RWE politically by redefining institutional stakes in the conflict over the
 technological system. But the Prussian ministers decided in 1905 and again in
 early 1906 not to participate in the RWE because of local opposition to the com-
 pany, particularly in Westphalia.31 The RWE instead began modifying its institu-
 tional makeup by selling stock to cities and counties and by placing representa-
 tives of these potent institutions on the RWE's board. This maneuver solved
 political problems by providing the semblance of public influence over the RWE.
 State agencies had sided with communal governments against the RWE, but the
 RWE could gain state support if it had communal allies. The new mixed business
 form also helped the RWE financially. It could gain new territory by exchanging
 RWE stock and a position on the board for communally owned power systems
 and communally guaranteed loans.32 Institutional innovation allowed technologi-
 cal change, in the Ruhr and in other areas of Germany.
 Landrate in the Westphalian section of the Ruhr followed a similar path in
 establishing a mixed corporation. After receiving ministerial permission in De-
 cember 1905, Gerstein helped build a new company in Bochum that drew on a
 Westphalian mine for electric power, on Berlin banks for financing, and on elec-
 trical manufacturers for expertise. The chairman of the board was Walther Ra-
 thenau, director of the Berliner Handelsbank and son of the founder of the elec-
 trical manufacturing firm AEG. The chairman of the managing committee was
 also a director of the AEG's subsidiary for electric light and power companies.
 The new company, Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen AG, founded in July 1906, com-
 bined municipal, county, banking, mining, and electrical manufacturing interests.
 It rapidly took steps to define a territory from which it could exclude the RWE.33
 30 Karl Gerstein, "Anlage eines gemeinsame kommunalen Elektrizitatswerkes fur den rheinisch-
 westfalischen Industriebezirk," 25 Nov. 1905, Regierung Dusseldorf 9892, pp. 245-246, HStA Di!;
 and Gerstein to District President of Dusseldorf, 25 Nov. 1905, ibid., pp. 242-243.
 31 For evaluations of Stinnes's first offer and its rejection see Peters, "Hafenerweiterung Ruhrort,"
 26 Mar. 1904, Regierung Dusseldorf Prasidialburo 1068, pp. 17-24, HStA Dii. Also see ibid., pp.
 5-13; and Finance Minister, Minister of Public Works, Minister of the Interior, and Minister for
 Commerce and Industry to Stinnes, 11 Jan. 1906, Regierung Munster 5537, Staatsarchiv Munster.
 32 See Asriel, R.W.E. (cit. n. 21), pp. 10, 14-15; and Richard Passow, Die gemischt privaten und
 offentlichen Unternehmungen auf dem Gebiete der Elektrizitats- und Gasversorgung und des
 StraJ3enbahnwesens (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1912).
 33 Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 17 Dec. 1906, KrA 495, pp. 304-306, Stadtarchiv
 Bochum; Landkreis Bochum, "Verwaltungs-Bericht des Kreis-Ausschul3es des Landkreises Bo-
 chum," 1906, pp. 48-49, ibid., and Walter Lipken, Die v'ereinigten Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen,
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 The corporation, like the reorganized RWE, combined business and government
 in a new institution, and, as in the RWE, business predominated. But unlike the
 RWE's institutional innovation, innovation in Arnsberg did not go far enough to
 suit local interests. National electrical and banking corporations provided exper-
 tise and financing for the Westphalian mixed company, but they did not protect
 local municipal and county officials who wanted to force the RWE out of West-
 phalia. The officials had to take over the company and divide the Ruhr to protect
 their interests.
 VI. DIVIDING THE RUHR
 Landrate, mayors, small manufacturers, and electrical manufacturers in the dis-
 trict of Arnsberg worked together in 1906 to try to find a way of building a new
 power station or taking over the RWE's second power system near Dortmund in
 order to provide electricity for the area around Hagen to the south. County and
 municipal governments provided the forum for debate and negotiations, but dif-
 ferent local social and economic interests used the local institutions to pursue
 different ends. Gerstein's Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen in Bochum represented
 several county governments, but the electrical manufacturers remained predomi-
 nant. To the east the city of Dortmund sought to protect municipal interests and
 the municipal system, which was increasingly insulated from the threat of the
 RWE by the growing power of the Bochum company. The small manufacturers
 in and around Hagen who controlled local governments felt themselves squeezed
 by a heavy industry that provided raw materials and consumed end products.
 They wanted control of economic and technology policy in their region, but they
 did not yet have a source of alternating current.34 The district president of Arns-
 berg sought consensus among the three disparate groups to build a company to
 take over the RWE's Westphalian power system. He had to rely, however, on
 the ability and willingness of Landrate and mayors to use their roles as heads of
 local self-government to create new economic organizations.
 The Arnsberg president did not have enough administrative power to hold the
 alliance together. All three groups opposed Stinnes and the RWE, but the small
 manufacturers in and around Hagen opposed collaboration with anyone in the
 heavy industrial region and decided in 1907 to establish their own mixed power
 company.35 They succeeded because local county and municipal governments
 were autonomous enough to work against the district president and communal
 officials in the heavy industrial section of the Ruhr. The electrical manufacturers
 in the Bochum company also hindered unified development. Walther Rathenau
 directed negotiations for Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen but ignored local goals.
 Landrat Gerstein wanted to make taking over the RWE's second power system
 GmbH Dortmund-Bochum-Muinster und ihre Entwicklungsgeschichte (Dortmund: Lensing, 1926), pp.
 22-27.
 34 On the negotiations see B 3-1977, 1978, and 1983, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; on Hagen see Ludwig
 Beutin, Geschichte der sudwestfalischen Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Hagen und ihrer Wirt-
 schaftslandschaft (Hagen: Linnepe, 1956), pp. 60-141.
 35 See Willi Cuno (mayor of Hagen) to District President of Arnsberg, 30 Jan. 1907, B 3-1978, pp.
 382-386, Stadtarchiv Dortmund; and Cuno, "Das kommunal Elektrizitatswerk Mark: AnschluJ3 an ein
 Verbandswerk oder Bau einer eigenen Zentrale," 3 Feb. 1907, B 3-1977, pp. 204-211, ibid.
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 one basis of agreement between the three Westphalian groups, but Rathenau and
 Bochum's Berlin bankers did not think the investment was necessary.36 Ra-
 thenau also ignored the interests of local officials in his negotiations with the
 RWE and Dortmund over territory to be served by the companies and financial
 arrangements to resolve differences among them.37 Westphalian Landrate had
 not yet found a workable institutional basis for protecting their autonomy
 through electrification.
 By 1909 they had. Landrat Gerstein took over negotiations from Rathenau in
 late 1907 and set boundaries between electrical supply areas that satisfied his
 fellow Landrate in Recklinghausen and Gelsenkirchen. He celebrated the agree-
 ment as the "second founding" of the Bochum electrical company.38 The RWE's
 position in Westphalia had become untenable. It joined two heavy industrial
 companies, Dortmund, and Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen in 1908 to form a new
 mixed company to purchase and operate the RWE's Westphalian power system.
 The city of Dortmund dominated the new company and used it to build a regional
 system surrounding the city and county of Dortmund, served by the municipal
 power company.39 There was also a realignment within the Bochum company.
 Because the Berlin bankers did not protect local interests and because the com-
 pany drew increasingly on counties for financial support, in 1909 the Landrdte of
 Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, and Recklinghausen decided to buy out the banks'
 shares in the power company.40 The Bochum company was then locally con-
 trolled and communally owned, and it could expand in the same manner as did
 the RWE. Both these firms offered stock and positions on the board to cities and
 counties as incentives for joining their electric power system. The new mixed
 structures internalized conflict among institutions as a basis for expanding tech-
 nological systems, but none of them could unify the Ruhr in one system.
 VII. CONCLUSION
 Technological change after 1900 provided the means for building regional techno-
 logical systems. But those systems did not grow inexorably as a result of the
 development of new technology. New institutional arrangements were necessary
 because Germany was divided among a number of large competing institutions
 36 See Dbpke's report on the meeting of representatives of Elektrizitatswerk Mark, Elektrizitats-
 werk Westfalen, and the city of Dortmund, 14 Nov. 1906, B 3-1977, pp. 54-64, Stadtarchiv Dort-
 mund. See also Coels to Walther Rathenau, 28 Nov. 1906, KrA 495, pp. 262-266, Stadtarchiv Bo-
 chum; and Gerstein to Rathenau, 19 Dec. 1906, ibid., pp. 308-309.
 37 For local reactions to Rathenau's contract with Stinnes see Landrat in Recklinghausen to Ger-
 stein, 6 Sept. 1907, KrA 496, pp. 116-117, Stadtarchiv Bochum; and Gerstein to District President of
 Arnsberg, 31 Oct. 1907, ibid., pp. 108-112.
 38 See Gerstein to District President of Arnsberg, 20 Dec. 1907, ibid., pp. 185-186. For the RWE's
 original demands and the new agreement see Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen to Gerstein, 7 Jan. 1908,
 ibid., pp. 206-219.
 39 For the founding of the new company, the Westfalisches Verbands-Elektrizitatswerk, see Dis-
 trict President of Arnsberg to provincial president of Westphalia (von Recke), 11 Apr. 1980, Oberpra-
 sidium 6587, Staatsarchiv Munster; and " 1. Aufsichsrats-Versammlung des Westfdlischen Verbands-
 Elektrizitatswerkes A.G.," 29 Apr. 1908, B 3-1991, pp. 102-110, Stadtarchiv Dortmund. For the new
 mixed company's development see Lipken, Vereinigten Elektrizitatswerke Westfalen (cit. n. 33), pp.
 10-20.
 40 Karl Gerstein, Albert Hempel, Ludwig LeBret, and Ludwig Aschoff, "Denkschrift uber den
 Erwerb von Akten des Elektrizitatswerk Westfalen durch die Beteiligten Kommunalverbande," I
 Jan. 1909, KrA 501, p. 49, Stadtarchiv Bochum.
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 that tried to use the new technology to expand at the expense of other institu-
 tions. Cities were growing rapidly and offering new services to their own citizens
 and to neighbors, many of whom were eventually incorporated into larger cities.
 County administrations were made up of people who generally shared the oppo-
 sition of Prussian civil servants to urban concentration and industrial growth.
 They also sought to overcome the parochial goals of municipal governments that
 hoped to use municipal monies to solve municipal rather than county or even
 regional problems. Electrical manufacturers sought the potential profits from
 building, supplying, and running regional systems. Contingent events influenced
 development. In the Ruhr, heavy industrialists used electrical technology to pro-
 mote vertical integration and their power in the region. Municipal and state gov-
 ernments in Westphalia hoped to build their own regional system but built more
 local ones instead. The RWE was too powerful in the Rhineland, and opposition
 to it did not overcome all local differences. In the Rhineland, after initial op-
 position, municipal and county governments began supporting the heavy indus-
 trialists.
 But not before an institutional innovation. Institutions provided the framework
 for discussions and fights over electrification. The resolution of the struggle re-
 quired the development of new, mixed corporations that could combine compet-
 ing institutions and internalize conflict so that electrification could take place.
 The RWE began selling stock to cities and counties or exchanging stock for
 existing facilities. It also placed public representatives on its board. Westphalian
 interests followed the same tactic. The balance of power in mixed, public-private
 corporations reflected local conditions in the Ruhr and the rest of Germany. No
 one institution, new or old, communal or commercial, was powerful enough to
 force unification of the Ruhr in one technological system. Since institutional re-
 lationships were at issue in the deployment of new technology, technological
 change was inherently political. In building technological systems, Stinnes, Ger-
 stein, and others had to construct new institutional relationships through new
 business forms.
